Abstract-The research presented in this paper offers a way of supporting the security currently in place in critical infrastructures by using behavioural observation to add to the Defence in Depth (DiD). Our approach is proactive and continually looks to identify patterns or behaviour, which is out of place in the ordinary operations of the infrastructure. As this work demonstrates, applying behavioural observation to critical infrastructure protection has effective results. In this paper, our design for Behavioural Observation for Critical Infrastructure Security Support (BOCISS) is presented. This entails an outline of the system architecture; an explanation of the system modes of operation; the development of a simulation for data construction purposes and the evaluation of our system using our simulated data.
INTRODUCTION
Critical infrastructures include sectors such as energy resources, finance, food and water distribution, health, manufacturing and government services [1] . In recent years, critical infrastructures have become increasingly dependent on ICT; more interconnected and linked to the Internet. Consequently, this makes these systems more vulnerable and increases the threat of cyber-attack [2] . In addition, the growing use of wireless networks means that infrastructures can be more susceptible to direct attack than ever before [3] .
Traditionally, protecting against environmental threats was the main focus of critical infrastructure preservation. Now, however, with the emergence of digital threats, the focus has changed and infrastructures are facing a different danger with potentially debilitating consequences [4] . Conventional security techniques are struggling to keep up to date with the sheer volume of innovative and emerging attacks; therefore, considering fresh and adaptive solutions to existing computer security approaches is a must [5] .
In this paper, we present our system, which uses behavioural observation for critical infrastructure security support (BOCISS). The main aim of BOCISS is to provide operators with the ability to detect abnormal behaviours and identify subtle changes in activity. The system collects data and acts as a plug-in device, where it trains itself to identify normal behaviour and sound alarms when anomalous behaviour is detected. In addition, a user interface layer provides the operator with the ability to interact with BOCISS and view alarms.
BOCISS offers an alternative approach to cyber-attack detection by operating independently of the control system and the security in place. Existing threat management systems are supported by using effective data classifiers to detect subtle behavioural changes in system behaviour. Issues, such as network slowing, are avoided by the fact that BOCISS has no control over network activity and therefore, does not inhibit processing. In addition, there is no need to remain one-step ahead of existing attacks, as security is offered by maintaining the status quo of operational performance.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Sections 2, 3 and 4 present our system approach, architecture and design. In Section 5, we present our simulation environment, which is used to construct data for the evaluation of BOCISS. In Section 6 we evaluate the effectiveness of our system and the paper is concluded in Section 7.
II. SYSTEM APPROACH BOCISS fits into the control layer, which has direct cabled access to the network for data extraction (as displayed in figure 1 ). The network is generally closed and local to the infrastructure. Typically, physical data is collected from a huge variety of sources meaning different types of data will form part of the data collection. This data is also encoded in the required infrastructure protocol format. It is this data, collected by the RTUs, which is extracted from the network and used to perform behaviour analysis. The active nature of BOCISS (unlike the passive technique used by many honeypots [6] and UTMs [7] ) means that it actively searches and identifies patterns that stand out as being abnormal. Figure 1 displays a snapshot of part of a critical infrastructure layout with the addition of BOCISS as a plugin observer. Data collection continues as normal for the control system and BOCISS extracts data separately. Extracted blocks or windows of data are of a predesigned size and prevent data overload from occurring during extraction from the network. In acting as an observer and a separate entity to the control system, BOCISS provides autonomous system analysis.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN BOCISS operates in three different modes, all of which take place inside one observer unit, which extracts windows of data from the network. The modes of operation include: Data Collection, Training and Prediction.
To achieve this, BOCISS is composed of various mechanisms and data stores. After connecting to the Network Layer, BOCISS registers itself and begins data collection. Extracted network data is converted in the data manager and, depending on the mode of operation, is directed to the data store or for feature extraction. Features, initially sent to a temporary data store, are used to create feature vectors and train classifiers to identify system behaviours. A system control governs the operations and interprets the classification results for the UI. A high-level view of the BOCISS observer design is shown in Figure 2 , which displays the system architecture and interaction between the components. The use of a data manager enables BOCISS to act a plugin device. The data manager uses a data acquisition application (DAQ) and interprets the protocol-formatted data extracted from the network. A data acquisition application is constructed from a hardware component complete with a piece of software, which extracts data from a source.
The protocol data could be either in DNP3 or Modbus, particularly if the critical infrastructure uses a SCADA system. The data manager converts it to raw data using the data acquisition application and sends it either to a database, which is able to store both normal and threat behaviour separately, or to a feature extraction process.
Data extraction is an important procedure, which affects the scalability of BOCISS. Extracting data in blocks allows for a control over the volume of data being collected and prevents data overload.
The data extraction control regulates the extraction of data from the network and informs the DAQ when data collection is required. Initially, converted raw data is given an ID tag for identity, depending on BOCISS' mode of operation. For example, if in training mode the data will be tagged as either normal behaviour or abnormal behaviour. Protocol formatted data is extracted via a 'Get Next' command and the collection process is governed by the system control.
One of the principal components is the system control, which regulates operations and notifies the data manager when to perform its data processing functions. The system control is required to execute a variety of functions, which include several key aspects, such as:
• Instructing the data manager to start or stop data collection.
• Allowing the user to input data collection requirements.
• Converting classification results to a format to present system behaviour via a user interface.
• Presenting a threat identification to the operator.
• Comparing a detected threat with a database of known threat behaviours. During each mode, the system control is kept informed about system progress, in order to autonomously switch BOCISS between its three modes of operation.
Initially, the operator will define a period of time for the data collection mode. The system control will switch BOCISS to training mode once the predefined data collection is completed. Prediction mode is enabled once the data classifiers have been successfully trained. If anomalous system behaviour is detected during run-time, the system control also compares behavioural patterns with a stored known database of threat behaviours and alerts the operator.
The system control requests the various system states, notably from the data manager and classifiers. Commands, including start/stop data collection are also issued by the system control.
Once data extraction has been established by the DAQ, the data manager makes a decision about its destination. Data sent to the database will be directed to one of two deposits; one for normal behaviour and one for threat behaviour. The use of a database was chosen for several reasons. Mainly, because critical infrastructures commonly use databases for storing a retrieving data so its implementation offers consistency for a critical infrastructure.
The data is required to have and ID and specified location in the database. Each block of collected data is positioned in a row with a column for each component data is collected from. The data manager extracts the data sequentially, based on the IDs, when the command to enter training mode is executed by the system control.
When in training or prediction mode, data requires preprocessing. This acts a filter to remove unwanted values and clean the data prior to feature extraction. Pre-filtering the data removes any elements that are not required by the feature extraction stage. Redundant values, which do not conform to the filter parameters and irrelevant aspects of the data are discarded.
This process includes various stages, such as: cleaning and normalisation of raw data. Cleaning involves verifying that there are no missing values and smoothing out data which inconsistent. Noisy data, which refers to corrupt and meaningless values, are also removed.
Normalisation has two purposes. Firstly, it removes duplicated values; otherwise, the results of the data classification would be compromised. In our system, normalisation is also used to specify a value range to cut out coefficients, which are outside the scope of our requirement.
Features are aspects of the data, which allow for a representation of overall system behaviour. In the training mode, extracted features form feature vectors for both normal and abnormal behaviour. The feature vectors are then deposited in a temporary feature store until the data processing is complete. Once all the required data has been processed, a signal is sent to inform the temporary feature store to transfer its contents onto the data classifiers.
The features selected are unique for each critical infrastructure but they could include, for example, aspects such as: overall water volumes; steam output; energy creation; water tank levels or speed of water flow. They are constructed by cataloguing the data into designated representations of the dataset.
During training mode, a feature vector would be labelled with an ID, which would identify it as either part of the data set belonging to normal behaviour or abnormal behaviour. During prediction mode, the label would be unknown to the classifier. Classification is achieved using the feature vectors from the temporary feature store and training the chosen classifiers to identify normal and abnormal system behaviour. This process is known as supervised learning.
Linear classifiers accurately divide the data into groups based on characteristics and identify changes in patterns of behaviour, which would otherwise be difficult to observe. Once the classifiers are trained, they are able to function selfsufficiently during run-time.
BOCISS has its own user interface, which allows the operator to interact with the system. The design of the user interface is divided into two parts. One to permit the user to insert system commands. The other to enable BOCISS to present system behaviour and threat alerts.
The ability to insert data collection commands enables BOCISS to be generic and applicable to multiple types of infrastructure. Commands maybe include, the type of data extracted from the network or which features to construct from the dataset. When threats are detected, an alarm is signalled. Details about the intrusion are displayed in the threat alert information box.
IV. SYSTEM MODES OF OPERATION
The components discussed in the system architecture work together autonomously. In this section, a description on the three modes of operation, and how they function, is provided.
The data collection mode requires the use of the data manager, the system control and the data store. Data collection is conducted in two phases, when the system is functioning normally and when abnormally. Evenly sized datasets of both normal and abnormal behaviour are stored in the database. The stored data is used supply data to the classifiers during training mode. The high-level view of the process, which takes place during the data collection mode, is shown in Figure 4 . Data collection is performed over a pre-defined time, for example a week or a month. The period is application specific, in order to establish an accurate overview of how the system behaves. As each is different, the period chosen will depend on what services are provided by the critical infrastructure.
Executing the data collection process is reliant on receiving a 'collect data' command from the system control.
As previously mentioned, both normal and attack behaviour data are required. Both are collected during this stage. The data manager controls the flow and direction of data to the database. The system control monitors the level of data collection and terminates the process once the pre-defined level of data has been collected. Once the database is filled, the command is given by the system control to begin the training process.
The training mode involves extracting features from stored datasets. When the command is executed to begin training mode, data is extracted from the database and preprocessed. A 'get next' message is sent from the feature extraction process to the data manager until the data store has been fully processed. The extracted feature vectors, which have been stored in the temporary data store, are used to train the classifiers. The training process, and the components involved, is displayed in Figure 5 . This supervised learning stage requires the evenly sized data sets of both the normal behaviour and attack data. When the classifiers are trained, they are able to operate autonomously and detect anomalies in data collected from the network in real-time. Completion of the data classification process is monitored by the system control, which sends a signal to the UI upon completion. Once the training is completed, BOCISS changes to prediction mode and operates in run-time to evaluate system behaviour. The prediction mode involves transferring real-time data to the classifiers, via the feature extraction, in order to identify any changes in system behaviour. Figure 6 displays this mode of operation. Any detected changes in system behaviour would be the result of a cyber-attack taking place on the infrastructure.
Data is, again, mined in window blocks from the network. Firstly, it is pre-processed then features are constructed. These real-time features are then inserted into to the pre-trained classifiers for analysis. The prediction mode is one of the aspects, which distinguishes BOCISS from other approaches to intrusion detection. Applying effective data classification algorithms to real-time data allows for the identification of subtle system changes in behaviour.
V. SIMULATION
BOCISS requires a significant amount of realistic critical infrastructure data. This is provided by the development of a nuclear power plant simulation using Siemens Tecnomatix Plant Simulator and the programming language SimTalk. Using this simulation, realistic data is constructed and collected, when both functioning as normal and during a cyber-attack scenario. Figure 7 displays our Tecnomatix interpretation of the system design. The diagram displays an overview of the whole system. Each of the mechanisms has a graphical icon to represent its function more clearly. They can also be expanded to detail their interconnectivity and the various components, which allow the system to operate. Each of the mechanisms are explained. • The Water Source: The production of water is supplied by three sources, including two infinite sources, representing a lake or ocean, and one water tower. The water requires filtering. It is, therefore, supplied to one large pipe, which is then sifted for impurities before being pumped into the Water Tanks.
• The Two Water Tanks: Water produced by the water source is collected in two tanks. This effectively acts as a buffer and controls the water flow in the system. Two pumps are used to send water from the tanks to the Condenser.
• The Condenser: One of the most complex mechanisms in the simulation is the condenser which consists of an interaction between two system loops. In the condenser, steam is cooled and converted to water and the water is subsequently sent to the reactor to be heated.
• The Reactor: The intake of water is combined with heat from a nuclear reaction to produce steam in the reactor mechanism. The steam is sent to the generator mechanism via two steam pipes.
• The Generator: Steam sent from the reactor rotates a turbine. Each unit of steam turns the turbine once, and energy is produced. Excess steam is directed via a network of pipes to the condenser system for cooling.
• Acid Tank and Emergency Coolant: In case of system failure, two storage tanks, one containing Boronic Acid and one containing emergency coolant, are in place. The emergency coolant is required in the case of a failure in the provision of water to the reactor. The Acid is needed for emergency situations such as core overload as a result of cascading system failure. The simulated power plant consists of a large number of components, including connections and interfaces. Data can be extracted from the nuclear power plant simulation by implementing a Method in order to export data as a set. An example of the coding for this is displayed in figure 8 . Another approach is to insert an entity referred to as a 'TimeSequence' to act as an observer for a specific system component and extract pre-specified data. The types of data we can collect include: performance data, material flow data, resource allocation, and system load data. In our simulation, we used this second approach as it allowed for more flexibility during data collection and allowed us to target specific system components for data extraction. Using this approach, we constructed a significantly large customised dataset which matched our requirements for the evaluation of BOCISS.
VI. EVALUATION
In this paper, BOCISS is evaluated using the data constructed from our simulation. Using the data constructed, 48 feature vectors consisting of 39 features each are created. 24 vectors used for normal behaviour and 24 for attack behaviour.
The 24 feature vectors are constructed as the simulation is operated normally for a day and abnormally for a second day. Every hour features are extracted from the data, resulting in one feature vector for every simulated hour. Table 2 displays a sample of some of the records created for both normal and anomalous system behaviour. 'One' refers to normal behaviour while 'Two' refers to threat behaviour. Data classification algorithms were then applied to learn correct system behaviour and, subsequently, the identification of threats. Initially, this was done, by randomly dividing the data, using MATLAB, into a 50% training set with the rest of the 50% assigned to a test set. Three classifiers are then applied: Uncorrelated Normal Density based Classifier (UDC); Linear Discriminant Classifier (LDC) and Quadratic Discriminant Classifier (QDC). Each classifier uses a different approach to sort or divide data into groups based on characteristics in order to create a classification.
Using the above data classifiers, the results of each initial experiment for threat identification is displayed in figures 9 to 11 in order of successful data classification. Each figure displays a confusion matrix which determines the distribution of errors across all classes [8] . It displays how successful each technique was at classifying normal and threat behaviour.
It shows true positive, false positive, true negative and false negative values. Diagonal elements show the performance of the classifier while off-diagonal present errors. The first confusion matrix, in Figure 9 , presents the results for UDC, which shows 95.8% correct results for initial object classification.
In contrast, LDC produces results, which are lower. It is 83.3% successful in accurately classifying the data, into its correct groups. This is shown in the Confusion Matrix in Figure 10 . QDC again gives a lower percentage of 79.2, as shown in Figure 11 . In order to give a more accurate evaluation of which of the classifiers is most successful and consistent, the experiments were conducted 30 times. The reason the classification experiments are conducted 30 times is to account for errors and to give consistency [9] . Statisticians identify that experiments conducted 30 times provide an adequate realistic average [9] .
UDC performs consistently; however, LDC and QDC also achieve high results but have lower consistency. The highest result for each is 100 per cent, although the mode value for LDC (83.3 %), the value which occurs the most frequently, is significantly lower than it is for both QDC (88.9 %) and UDC (97.3%) analysis. In figure 12 the result from each of the 30 experiments for the three classifiers is displayed, with the mean average for each presented. The experiments show that abnormal behaviour is identified for improving the level of security and assisting the operator with attack detections. The best result is achieved using UDC, which has, in this case, 97.3% accurate classification of behaviour.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The seriousness of critical infrastructure protection is clearly a key issue. Their vulnerability to the growing cyberthreat enforces this further. Using our novel approach to identify system threats, a layer of security is added to the defence in depth.
Future work will involve the adaptation of BOCISS to identify specific attacks, in addition to its current behavioural observation services. This will be done by recognising known behaviour changes, and what is causing them by drawing from system information stored in a database. This approach differs from signature-based detection as it looks at physical changes in component behaviour and uses them to identify attacks, which are known to cause those changes. Traditional signature-based detection identifies known data signatures, such as globally known viruses.
However, the addition of a data store of known system behaviour when under specific attacks, allows for a comparison between identified threats and known attack behaviour. Information in the database would only be drawn from once a threat has been identified. This process would operate by allowing the system control to perform a threat comparison function.
